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The Brexit Referendum: Testing the Support of Elites and their Allies for Democracy; or, Racists, 
Bigots and Xenophobes, Oh My! 
1. Introduction 
The result of the referendum on Britain’s continued membership of the EU clearly came as a shock 
to many, including national and local political elites and those who allied themselves to the elite 
cause of the UK remaining a member of the EU. Indeed, referendum on any subject often test the 
tolerance of elites (and those in disagreement with the result who ally themselves to the elite cause) 
of direct engagement of the public in deciding on a single question of long-term policy. Yet, other 
established and mature democracies, with Switzerland being the notable example, are able to use 
referendum more extensively than the UK without a collective and sustained campaign by the losing 
side to overturn the result.  
As a seemingly well established and mature democracy, Britain has used referenda sparingly and has 
also employed them almost in a plebiscitary mode to secure support for a government policy (see, 
Qvortrup, 2005:85-8). Indeed, the EU referendum itself could be seen as the government seeking 
approval to its own policy preference for the UK remaining a member of the EU, rather than a 
genuine desire to allow the voters to select an option that would then be enacted (a theme that will 
be explored in the paper). Further, the referendum in Scotland and Wales on the creation of 
devolved chambers, were used to secure support for a controversial policy that the then labour 
government wished to introduce. Indeed, there has not been a fraction of the intense elite 
opposition to the results of those referenda because the majority of the political, intellectual, 
cultural and business elites had received the result they desired. By now it is possible to critique here 
the use of the term elite as though it refers to some hegemonic and cohesive whole (which it does 
not) and thus the way in which that term is defined and employed is set out in the next section.  
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The reaction to the EU referendum result and the continuing attempts to derail or ignore the 
decision of a public vote and the ongoing war of words between those who support leaving the EU 
and those who prefer to remain a member, has shown this issue to be one of the most bitter and 
divisive political questions that has faced the country for some time. The damage that divisive 
debate and issue will ultimately do to the fabric of democracy remains to be seen overtime. But, 
what emerges is a sense that the vote and the reaction to it, are about far wider issues than the 
membership on a supranational governing institution. Rather, what lies behind the current toxic 
nature of the continuing campaign to remain a member of the EU, are two competing and 
irreconcilable visions of society and the future of the country that cuts across a simple right-left 
political divide.   
One thing is clear the result of the referendum was unexpected by political, business, cultural and 
intellectual elites and their allies and that there is an intolerance of the result that raises questions 
about the nature and practices of liberal democracy and the acceptance of dissent from elite 
preferences (from now on the term elite will be used to encompass political, intellectual, cultural 
and business elites unless a distinction is necessary). The nature of a public vote is distinct from the 
usual mechanisms of safe release for political dissent within a representative democracy, such as 
marches, demonstrations and political campaigns. The public vote on a single question requires the 
same mechanism as the election of political representatives, which very simply put is: a campaign, a 
choice, a vote and the acceptance of the outcome of that vote. Thus, in opposing the outcome of a 
referendum, on whatever subject, we enter into the dangerous territory of attacking the 
fundamental mechanisms of liberal democratic representative democracy, which simply put is: a 
campaign, a choice, a vote and the acceptance of the outcome of that vote. The nuances of this 
blunt argument are explored later in the paper. One thing is clear however, that the reaction to the 
result from those wishing the country to remain a member of the EU brings into stark relief the 
questions: what or whom do representatives represent, are they delegates, trustees or politicos of 
whoever or whatever it is they represent and what happens when they disagree with whoever it is 
they represent (see, Eulau, et al, 1959, Manin, 1997, Judge, 1999).  
There is of course a wider question about the role of unelected and elected elites generally within 
political society and the relationship they have with non-elite actors who, when given the 
opportunity of employing the public vote, are periodically and momentarily elevated to equal status 
with the politically powerful and influential, when it comes to casting their single vote alongside 
their elite fellow citizens. But the EU referendum has struck at something far deeper and 
fundamental than merely the choice of which party will form the government and it has plunged 
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politics and political discourse into a dark place that raises the issue of a developing post-democratic 
representative democracy and government.  
While walking through the ‘dark forest’ the reaction of Dorothy, the Tin Man and Scarecrow to 
hearing noises they cannot understand or interpret is to attribute those noises to creatures that may 
wish to eat them – they continue their journey skipping while chanting: Lions, and tigers and bears, 
oh my!  In a similar vein remainers who realise that the result of the EU referendum was also a 
challenge to their long-established and cherished policies on internationalism, multi-culturalism and 
mass immigration and cannot understand or interpret that challenge, have equally been skipping 
through the dark wood while accusing their opponents of being the unholy trinity of racists, bigots 
and xenophobes, to which could be added, for dramatic effect, ‘oh my!’ Such a formulation of words 
has been used overtly in public discourse abut also condensed into the short hand term of ‘populist’ 
or ‘populism’ (Canovan, 1991, Taggart, 2002); a use of the term that perverts the word ‘popular’ in 
popular democracy.  
It is clear from the nature of the referendum campaign and the shadow campaign to over-turn the 
results of the referendum (or to act in a way as to negate its effect) that the issue has become one of 
the most toxic and divisive political questions for some time. Partly because it represents a rejection 
by non-elites of elite preferences and partly because it also represents a rejection of a wider, long 
term elite policy to change the very nature of the country. The EU referendum and what it and the 
result represents is a fundamental cleavage in political and civil society. It also represents the 
political cleavage between the voters – as much as votes display cleavages effectively –in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland and voters in England and Wales. The tone of the debate post-referendum 
however, has been to lay the ‘blame’ as if blame is appropriate, for the result on a nasty English 
nationalism conveniently forgetting that the majority of Welsh voters also voted leave. But, the 
argument also seems to rest on the lazy and offensive assumption that every English person voted 
leave for racist, xenophobic and bigoted reasons – and probably because of their fear of lions and 
tigers and bears, too! Such an assumption is palpable nonsense but is a key tenet of the remoaner 
narrative post-referendum, which dangerously points towards a post-democratic technocracy in 
which the people are ignored for their own good, by a liberal-left-internationalist elite. 
It should be clear by now that the purpose of the paper is not to explore whether or not the decision 
to leave the EU was the correct one, or to explore the implications of leaving the EU. Rather, it is to 
draw out the lessons about the attitudes and reactions that have been displayed by elites and their 
allies, which backed remaining a member of the EU, for representative and participative democracy 
and for public engagement more widely. The paper explores what the reaction to the result tells us 
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about the thinness of the veneer of acceptance of popular democracy that covers the political 
system. The paper draws on contemporary sources, media reports, use of social media and 
campaign material and reports to assess the referendum campaign and the continued campaign to 
overturn an inconvenient result. It takes this approach as a way of exploring how such a campaign 
displays itself to what might be the casual voter. It may seem an impressionistic approach, but that is 
deliberate because the impression of the post-referendum shift to a post-democratic elite driven 
technocracy is all that the voter has to go on and it is the voter that will be effectively excluded from 
such a post-democratic polity. Such an approach also highlights the cleavage between a liberal-
internationalist elite and a large proportion of the electorate that remain unconvinced of that 
direction for their country. The paper is therefore not a psephology study; rather it draws out the 
lessons for democracy of the post-referendum display of contempt for the voter by elites and their 
allies. 
The next section of the paper sets out briefly the concepts used and the definitions of the terms that 
are employed in the paper to add clarity to the meaning attributed to each term. The third section 
examines and reviews the nature of the reaction to the result of the EU referendum for what it tells 
us about the relationship between elites and their allies to democracy, representation and public 
engagement and for what it tells us about the likely future of a democratic system that is showing 
the early signs of developing as a post-democratic, representative technocracy. The fourth section 
concludes by drawing together the main themes of the paper and lessons that can be learnt from 
the EU referendum and the reaction to the result.  
2. Understanding the Battle Ground: The Nature of the Combatants  
There are four dimensions to the elite groupings that are referred to which need to be defined for 
the purposes of this paper and those are political, business, cultural and intellectual elites; in 
addition, the use of the term ‘allies’ to those elites also needs to be defined. Elite theory provides a 
starting point for developing the definition with Pareto and Mosca setting out the division between a 
governing class and those who were directly or indirectly able to have a powerful influence over 
political decisions and the development of political policy and those who are not. They explored how 
such elites are made up of distinct social groups joined together with the common thread of a belief 
in their intellectual superiority and their right and duty to govern (see, Bottomore, 1993, Higley, 
2010). The influence that such elite groups wield within democratic and representative systems 
stands even though such elites may not elected to any public office. Rather, they operate through 
social, intellectual, political and economic interests and networks to influence and shape the activity 
of the elected political elite (Lasswell and Lerner, 1952, Putnam 1976, Lasch, 1996, Mills, 2000).   
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There is a danger in such analysis that elites are assumed to be a coherent and consistent entity with 
a coherent and generally accepted view of policy preferences and rather than that being the case 
elite membership rests on some economic, political, social or intellectual advantage, not signing up 
to a consistent policy line on every issue. There is however, a sense of shared power, position, 
status, access to decision-makers and a sense of mutual support that exists across and within elite 
groups (See, Lasswell and Lerner, 1952) and it is not policy agreement that makes for elite 
membership, but this shared social capital (Putnam, 1971). Thus, business elites for example, can be 
divided over whether to support continued membership of the EU but not lose their elite status if 
they disagreed among themselves on a single issue.  
So for the purposes of this paper the elites which supported continued membership of the EU and 
which now support overturning or negating the outcome of the vote, can be defined as an elite 
because of the power and influence they wield within the political system and because of the sense 
of mutual and shared support and respect that they display for other elite members. They are an 
elite because as elite theorists show they hold a position which distinguishes them from the non-
elite (governed) class (Parry, 2005). Elites also may inhabit certain streams of activity which inter-act 
and interlock, thus economic, intellectual and political elites will confine their activities to a 
particular stream, but their shared characteristics and ability to influence, crosses the streams. In 
addition, a political consensus develops which is shared to one degree or another, across elites and 
currently that consensus is to promote and develop an open, multi-cultural, diverse social and 
economic base to society that rest on the ability of people to move across borders for their 
economic reasons and benefit. Those taking advantage of an open framework for economic 
migration economic (and when excuses for increasing immigration arise through humanitarian crises 
such as that occurring in Syria) bring with them cultural and ethnic differences which feed into the 
elite policy preference for a multi-cultural, diverse multi-ethnic society. The EU and its liberal 
economic, social and cultural polices which, not surprisingly reflects elite preferences for multi-
culturalism and social diversity, provided an institutional framework and resources to further 
promote an elite vision of society and thus continued membership is central to the project of 
transforming the basis of western society.  
We have seen, during the referendum campaign and in the continued campaign to thwart the 
wishes of the majority of the electorate that voted, the emergence of distinct elites displaying their 
support for rejecting the results of the referendum: a political elite defined here as elected members 
of the governing class – parliamentarians, MEPs and local government councillors (that political elite 
and its support for EU membership displays a very clear cross-party consensus); an economic elite 
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focused on business, commercial and industrial activity; a cultural elite of celebrities, sports and 
media personalities, who have forcefully expressed support for EU membership through the 
privileged public platform they have at their disposal; and, an intellectual elite of academics, thinkers 
and scholars. Together, these three elite groups have been united in their revulsion that the 
governed class of non-elites could have rejected their policy preference and with it the wider 
political project with which they are associated – but reject it they did.  
But the support for continued membership of the EU and for overturning the result of the 
referendum, or holding a second referendum, is not just part of an elite response to the rejection of 
their policy preferences by the voting citizenry. The elite has a series of non-elite allies – which can 
be distinguished from those who simply voted remain and are now prepared to accept the result 
and wish the government to get on with it. The allies of the elite are a specific series of economic, 
political, social and intellectual groupings who distinguish themselves by their unwillingness to 
accept the result of the referendum and to continue to campaign to overturn or negate its outcome. 
These groupings, though well placed are not, in the strictest sense, members of a political, economic 
or intellectual elite. They are however, allied to continued membership of the EU and to the polices 
of the elite which sustain that membership: transforming the basis of western and certainly British 
society. They are opinion formers, thinkers, business people, political activists, the chattering 
classes, the twitterarti, the social media warriors and together with the elite they form: the 
remoaners! 
Thus, we have a political, economic and intellectual elite observable in the form that elite theorists 
would recognise and we have their allies. It is now time to explore the reaction of those two groups 
to the result of the referendum and the nature of their continued campaign to sustain membership 
of the EU for what it tells us about the thin veneer of democracy in our well established 
representative system and about the possibility of a post-democratic technocracy arising in the wake 
of the result.  
3. Rejecting the Elite Consensus: the Remoaners Respond.  
The result of the referendum to leave or remain in the European Union was clearly a devastating 
blow for the elites that had backed ‘remain’ and what is also clear is that they were not prepared for 
their advice to be rejected by the voters nor had any clear plan of what to do if it was. That lack of 
preparedness was displayed in quite sickening displays of emotional outbursts, anger, rage and 
insults aimed at the voters that had dared to reject not just the membership of the EU, but the long-
term plan outlined above to change the social, cultural and political landscape of the country. The 
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first and immediate casualty of the result (a part from remainer sensitivities and ego) was the Prime 
Minister who resigned the day after the referendum. In his resignation speech Cameron commented 
that: ‘The will of the British people is an instruction that must be delivered’(Guardian 24
th
 June 2016). 
Not a sentiment adopted by his remoaner colleagues across the elite groupings and their allies who 
have shown anything but a willingness to respond to the will of the people as displayed in the 
referendum, far from it.  
The referendum campaign was a divisive, intense and hard-fought affair which saw members of the 
three main UK-wide political parties take different positions and campaign for different outcomes 
from the voter. Assessing the campaign a conclusion to draw would be that the Conservative Party 
was the party that expressed publically the greater difference in opinion on the issue especially 
between senior members (despite internal politicking or some politicians delaying their declaration 
of which side they backed). That is not to say that there were not differences of opinion with the 
Labour party – which has historically had a left-wing section (including Jeremy Corbyn) opposed to 
EU membership and willing to question the EU’s democratic credentials. During the referendum 
however, the left-of-centre alternative to EU membership was noticeable by its absence, with 
Labour generally backing the EU membership in line with the views of the internationalists which 
now control the party. The Liberal Democrats were and still are the most fulsome supporters of 
remaining within the EU and overturning the result of the public vote, in such a way that brings into 
question the use of ‘liberal’ or ‘democrat’ in the party’s title.  
Other elites displayed varying degrees of unity or division of opinion on the issue of EU membership 
during the campaign which are visible by reviewing the media and social media coverage of the 
campaign and which do not require detailed research to uncover. The campaign also showed the 
divisions within economic elites from business and commerce which did display differences of 
opinion on the value of membership of the EU on the economic prospects facing the country. The 
remain elements of the cultural elite of media, sports and entertainment personalities were more 
vocal than their other (non-political) elite counter-parts who backed leave. But far from adding a 
dash of glamour to a dull political campaign the contribution of the cultural elite can be summed up 
in the sickening image of a multi-millionaire, Bob Geldof, with a crew of preening lovies, flicking a V 
sign to a flotilla fishermen on the River Thames displaying what EU membership had done to their 
industry and livelihoods. No clearer representation of the gap between the wealthy elite and its 
support for an undemocratic, autocratic, supra-national, Kafkaesque institution against the wishes 
and well-being of ordinary citizens, is likely to ever be found.    
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The support of the intellectual elite and experts on intellectual issues, was displayed in a Times 
Higher survey (THE June, 2016) which reported in June 2016 that 9 out of 10 university staff backed 
a remain vote. Again, showing a massive disconnect between academics and non-elites, who if they 
were representative of the overall population would have displayed a greater diversity of opinion. 
John Curtice is quoted in the article as explaining the divergence between the intellectual elite and 
non-elite, thus: 
epitomise the relatively socially liberal climate that you will see in most universities; that 
academics work in “a profession that’s become increasingly globalised and has a relatively 
large proportion of non-UK citizens working inside it...universities have been telling us that 
it’s in their interests to stay inside the European Union (THE June, 2016) 
Curtice’s comment not only explains the disconnect between the intellectual elite and other voters, 
it also hints at the socially liberal climate as the reason for such disconnect.  Indeed, academics form 
a vital, persistent and often enraged element of the elite reaction to the referendum result 
particularly using twitter and other social media to vent their anger at the temerity of the uniformed 
and obviously racist voters for daring to reject their expert opinion. Indeed, the ‘rejection’ of 
informed, expert opinion and the anger and frustration expressed by academics at the result has 
seen a reaction from the intellectual elite which can only be described as ‘neo-reactionary’: the 
voters were uniformed, unable to understand the complex issues and data involved, did not have 
sufficient access to the right information, or were unable and unwilling to commit the time to 
assessing and understanding the issues and consequences.  
The response of the intellectual elite echoes the arguments against extending the right to vote to 
women and the working class that were deployed in the 19th and early 20
th
 century (Keith-Lucas, 
1952, Pitkin, 1972, Held, 1993, Lizzeri and Persico, 2004, Chandler, 2007) and is a shameful reaction 
from a supposedly enlightened elite. The intellectual elite response has been all the more puzzling as 
it emerges from a part of the elite which supports greater public engagement, greater government 
responsiveness from the politically powerful to the concerns of the public and a greater sharing of 
political power – unless of course the voters get it wrong. The Times Higher article also hints at the 
self-interested motive of intellectual elite reaction in that the receipt of EU funding for universities 
binds them into the EU and to supporting its integrationist polices, a tactic employed by the EU in 
other fields (see, Jenkins, 2005).  
The political and governing elite which opposed leaving the EU have been no less inclined to use the 
neo-reactionary arguments, than the intellectual elite, that an uniformed electorate, voting on base 
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and illiberal views and woefully ill-informed about social and economic issues. The political elite 
were divided among themselves as to the desirability of leaving the EU and that is still the case. 
There are two elements to the political and governing elites’ and their allies campaign to overturn 
the result. The first is to delegitimise the result, partly through the neo-reactionary response and 
partly through an undermining of the use of referendum in a representative democracy. The second 
response is to use of parliamentary techniques to delay or prevent the government implementing 
the result and this is justified in the eyes of this elite group because of the nature of referendum in 
representative democracies such as the UK. Parliament’s view is not to do what the people want, 
rather it is to govern in their best interests – if those inserts can be clearly discerned. But, in a 
modern popular democracy of the early 21
st
 century this antiquated and Burkean argument is losing 
purchase (Birch, 1993, Garrard, 2002, Dryzek and Dunlevy, 2009) yet it is an argument that is still 
employed when elites require.  
Parliament and government may be the battle ground to prevent withdrawal from the EU but by 
overturning the result of the event which recorded the largest participation in the practice of 
electoral democracy in this country, Parliament would risk undermining its status, legitimacy and the 
trust of the voters – no matter how they voted. The remain elite and their allies clearly believe 
however, that this is a price worth paying. If the referendum was partly about sovereignty should 
parliament not have the final say, has been a central part of the elite remain narrative. That 
argument however, conflates national sovereignty and popular sovereignty with parliamentary 
sovereignty and employs the latter to undermine the two former ideas of sovereignty. In the 21
st
 
century reliance by political and governing elites on the notion of parliamentary sovereignty as a 
bulwark against an uneducated, ill-informed and ignorant electorate is a dangerous route. 
Moreover, to paraphrase Rousseau, if parliament wants to use its sovereignty to give its sovereignty 
away again to the EU, then it must be forced to be sovereign and the referendum forces it to be so 
by not returning political and governing power to the EU.   
What we find in the review of elite reaction to the EU referendum result is that the elite groupings 
identified for the purpose of this paper, are using similar and related tactics and arguments which 
cross over between the groupings, but some elites have a preferred response or theatre: the political 
elite choosing parliament or local government settings for their counter-campaign; the cultural elite 
using public platforms either social media or the theatres within which they are most prominent 
such as sporting and media events and which in some cases is the actual theatre; the economic elite 
mirror the cultural elite in their chosen battleground to promote their displeasure at the result; and, 
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the intellectual elite have also taken to public forum and scholarly journals and the press to maintain 
their counter-campaign.  
While each of our groupings have a chosen battlefield, to which they are not exclusively confined, 
but choose because it is known territory to them and while they have their preferred arguments 
those arguments area again not exclusive to each of the elites.  What therefore emerges is a clear 
elite consensus that not only were the public wrong, they were wrong for the wrong reasons (bad, 
ill-liberal, racist and economically illiterate ones) and that wrongness is therefore justifiably 
overturned by an elite who has the monopoly of knowledge, wisdom and virtue. Given today’s 
egalitarian political culture it is all the more surprising that elites are willingly and enthusiastically 
attempting to undermine the result of the referendum in almost those terms, or in a  barely veiled 
version of them.  
We see two main approaches to the elite reaction: the first is to de-legitimise the involvement of the 
public in taking part in making a decision on the issue, what has already been termed the neo-
reactionary approach. That deligitimisation can be understood through the lens of principle-agent 
theory (See, Stoker 1998, Laffont and Tirole, 1991, Thatcher and Sweet 2002) which suits nicely a 
representative democratic framework. With one person – the agent - able to make decisions on 
behalf of the principle, the latter will have a closer relationship to the issue in hand, or at least think 
as much, and may find that the agent acts not in the interests of the principle but in a version of it or 
even in their own interests. The agent is then faced with explaining why they acted differently or 
what was wrong with the principle’s original instructions. A clear link is made here with 
representative democracy and representative government (Manin, 1997, Judge, 1999) and the 
nature of the relationship political and government elites have with the voter. 
What we see in the elite use of a principle-agent / representative democracy-government approach 
to the result of the referendum is vital, for their purposes, in undermining of a referendum as a 
decision-making tool. First, the remain elite narrative around the referendum quickly came to claim 
that the referendum had been non-binding and a series of arguments deployed to substantiate this 
view which rested on parliamentary sovereignty and also to generate confusion about whether the 
issue of the binding nature of the referendum had been clarified.  Indeed, the remainer house-
journal, otherwise known as the Guardian newspaper, had raised the prospect of the non-binding 
nature of the referendum prior to its being held (https://www.theguardian.com) and this argument 
has been deployed since (Independent 17
th
 October 2017). The constitutional arguments about the 
supremacy of parliament or the voters are complex and can certainly be used by neo-reactionaries 
of the 21
st
 century to argue that the people are not supreme; such arguments however, have a 
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hollow and undemocratic ring in today’s politically egalitarian times. It is also worth quoting from a 
speech, then Prime Minister David Cameron made in parliament, on the referendum, on 22
nd
 
February 2016: 
This is a straight democratic decision – staying in or leaving – and no government can ignore 
that. 
Having a second renegotiation followed by a second referendum is not on the ballot paper. 
And for a Prime Minister to ignore the express will of the British people to leave the EU would 
not just be wrong, it would be undemocratic  
(source: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-commons-statement-on-eu-
reform-and-referendum-22-february-2016) 
It is to the remain elites eternal discredit that they cannot follow such a basic interpretation of 21
st
 
century popular democracy. If however, such an interpretation is undermined and the result fo the 
referendum, overturned or negated then this has worrying implications for the nature of our current 
democratic system. Cameron’s statement also weakens the second argument used to undermine the 
referendum – that the issue is somehow non-binary. Cameron makes it clear above and that the 
decision is simple: in or out of the EU. To argue that the EU referendum was non-binary, presumably 
because of the multi-layered nature of EU membership and the constituent parts of the leviathan 
that are involved, again deliberately complicates a straight forward choice by denying that choice 
exists. But voting to leave, was quite clear in its meaning and result: we leave the EU and all its 
constituent bits. The argument about the non-binary nature of this issue is a smoke screen for a 
more worrying tactic of delegitimising the referendum as an authoritative statement of the public 
decision. Moreover, if membership of the EU is non-binary then the choice before the voter at a 
general election is even more non-binary and complex and maybe the voter should be excluded 
from that choice too. But, if the referendum on 23
rd
 June 2016 was non-binding then so too was the 
referendum on 5th June 1975 and parliament need not have voted to give its sovereignty away after 
that result.  
Probably the most shameful part of the reaction of the elite and their allies has been the call for a 
second referendum either straightforwardly to overturn the June 2016 referendum or to agree or 
reject any deal that the EU might offer us on leaving. The latter simply providing the political elite in 
parliament with opportunities to campaign against any deal thus ensuring, if they can win that vote, 
then leaving the EU is delayed permanently. Between the first referendum on membership of the 
12 
 
Common Market on 5
th
 June 1975 and the second referendum on 23
rd
 June, 2016 on leaving the EU, 
the institution had not just changed its name but had changed beyond all recognition to that which 
the country had originally joined. But voters, over 41 years are entitled to change their mind. A third 
referendum is therefore entirely right, but only after a similar period of 40 or so years and not next 
week!  
The principle-agent / Representative Democracy / Government arguments deployed by elites to 
overturn or justify their campaign to overturn the referendum result and to ensure the country’s 
continued membership of the EU are summarised in  figure one, below: 
Figure one: The EU Referendum and Arguments for Undermining Popular Democracy 
Principle – Agent Arguments  Representative Democracy / Government 
Arguments 
Neo-Reactionary. Leave Voters: 
1. Were uninformed or insufficiently 
informed 
2. Were under-educated   
3. Lacked sufficient resources and 
information to make a reasoned 
judgment 
4. Gave emotional rather than intellectual 
responses to the campaign 
5. Had divergent goals and objectives to 
the elite which were incorrect or did not 
reflect their own best interests 
6. Acted illegitimately in that they voted for 
the wrong reasons  
 
Representative democracy negates need for 
referendum because 
1. Complexity of the issues militates against 
public involvement 
2. Non-binary nature of the issue 
3. An advisory not binding process 
4. Detailed and careful exploration of the 
issue needed which is impossible in a 
referendum 
5. Second referendum is needed to give the 
voters another chance to get it right or 
to agree on the deal offered 
 
 
What we have seen in the review of elite arguments should worry anyone who would claim to be a 
democrat or to express the need to engage or involve the public in decision-making who wishes to 
see political power shared more equally. The elite groupings identified in this paper as promoting 
continued EU membership and also promoting various ways of overturning or ignoring the 
inconvenient result of EU referendum, display a rejection of popular political power which can only 
be tolerated if the voters are restricted to competitive elitism – choosing who will choose - in other 
words, the role of the voter is to decide on the elevation of elites to positions of power through their 
sporadic input at general elections. In liberal democracy the political role of the citizen is restricted 
to infrequent electoral activity and the selection of political leaders. Anything more than the use of 
elections for the public to produce a government cannot be tolerated because the electorate lack 
the intellectual sophistication for wider political involvement in more complex issues (Sartori, 1962, 
Schumpeter, 1974).  
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What the elite and their allies’ reaction shows to referendum on continued membership of the EU 
and the connected rejection by the voters of their wider associated project of mass immigration and 
multi-culturalism designed to bring about a fundamental shift in the nature of society in this country, 
is the usual intolerance of a spurned elite. Yet, it is not solely an elite of the right-wing that has 
shown that intolerance. What has also been revealed is that left-wing political, economic, cultural 
and intellectual elites are equally intolerant when the voters reject their policy preferences. As a 
result of a rejection of their preferences, elites will spring into vocal defence of those preferences 
which without a dose of popular sovereignty they would otherwise not have to do.  
As has been noted, elites are not necessarily fully unified in their views especially around issues such 
as EU membership, although a clear preference for membership exists across the elites examined in 
the paper. As elites are not unified, neither too are the voters and it is clear that the result of the 
referendum was close, certainly in per centage terms, and voters have different opinions. But, the 
popular vote is a powerful implement in modern democracy – which is why elites, especially in this 
country, fight shy of its use or seek to leave the final decision with parliament where they can be   
better assured of support for their preferences. But the intensity of the reaction and of the counter-
campaign to overturn the result by elites and their allies is something less recognised among the 
ordinary voters – many of whom, no doubt are confused and confounded by the elite reaction. 
Indeed, remain voters often display a more sophisticated and accepting approach to the result than 
the elites and their allies. 
The reaction of the political, business, cultural and intellectual elites also point to a sharp turn away 
from the development of a post-representative democracy based on a liberal view of public 
engagement in politics and government, to a post-democratic technocracy where the input to the 
public is only tolerated insomuch as it expresses support for elite views.  The paper now concludes 
by exploring the possible future of popular sovereignty (rule by the people, or at least authoritative 
and powerful input by the voters into governing decisions) and even representative democracy that 
the elite reaction to the inconvenient result of the EU referendum might lead.  
Conclusion: Does Popular Sovereignty and Government have a Future? A Post Democratic State.  
The paper has reviewed the nature of the elite approach to the referendum to withdraw from 
membership of the EU and the reaction of the elite and their allies to the result. It also noted that 
the elite groups active in the campaign and counter-campaign to overturn, delay or ignore the 
outcome of the vote fall into political, business, cultural and intellectual categories of elites. Thus, 
not only do elites not form of cohesive, all encompassing illuminate style world government, but 
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elites may disagree on specific political issues, yet they are identified by their privileged access to 
political power, resources and avenues for influence and articulating their policy preferences – 
which they have done on the issue of continued membership of the EU.  The paper explored how 
those elites and their allies have sought to delegitimise both the referendum as a tool for allowing 
the public to take part in the decision about continued EU membership and have subsequently 
sought to de-legitimise and overturn the result. So, what do those actions tell us about the likely 
future of the current system of democracy and of popular engagement in political decision-making?   
First, that there is a very thin veneer of democratic acceptance of popular involvement in democracy 
among elite groupings and their allies. Moreover, the thinness of that veneer is demonstrated when 
non-elite involvement in decisions about high level political issues reject elite opinion and that when 
this occurs elites and their allies have no political or democratic qualms in seeking to overturn or 
reject that decision or to delegitimize it and those expressing it. The EU referendum result levelled a 
challenge not only at a central tenet of elite thinking but it also struck at a long-established liberal-
left consensus over issues such as immigration and multi-culturalism (also accepted by the main-
stream right). Thus, by rejecting EU membership and the political consensus which underpinned it 
the voters were indeed, for many racist, xenophobic and bigoted and thus their reasons for voting 
were bad and wrong. The implication is that representative democracy and competitive elitism may 
need to be refined and remodelled so that large scale popular involvement in democracy is curtailed 
over-time. 
Such reshaping leads to the second lesson we can draw from elite reaction to the EU referendum 
result and that is how the representative part of representative democracy may be further distanced 
from the voter. That shift implies the possible emergence of a post-democratic technocratic state 
where the opinion of the intellectual elite expert is preferenced over that of the voter. Expert 
opinion and values are more, rather than less, likely to shape policy on major long-term political 
decisions than is currently the case. But as we have seen intellectual elites are not politically 
representative or diverse when it comes to the opinions they hold. The reaction of much of the 
intellectual elite to the EU referendum has been to claim a monopoly of wisdom (and virtue) while at 
the same time engaging in a political debate that displays all the emotion, rage, and lack of 
appreciation and understanding that it is claimed motivated the views of those who voted to leave 
the EU.  Thus, expertise, independent knowledge, intellectual proficiency will be increasingly 
elevated above the base and emotional instincts of the voter, as though expertise is never tempered 
by value judgments and disagreement between experts themselves.   
15 
 
Third, that the political, intellectual, cultural and economic elites discussed in this paper will see the 
interaction between them as groups strengthened as they focus on derailing or preventing Brexit 
and therefore a stronger elite consensus cohesiveness develop around a set of policy objectives. 
Those policy objectives are unlikely to be tested by popular democratic mechanisms and very likely 
to be presented in the future, more and more as political and governing fait accompli or, simply 
developed overtime without the need to expose such polices to democratic testing, much like the 
elite consensus around the virtues of immigration and multi-culturalism. Popular democracy is likely 
to become less popular and less democratic. 
Fourth, supposing the elites are successful in derailing or overturning the referendum result, or are 
successful in pushing another referendum within the next year or so (rather than the 40 year gap 
between the initial and second referendum on EU membership). We could hypothesise that the very 
same people who over-turned the referendum will continue to try and compete, during that 
referendum, and future general and local elections, for the votes of the same voters they have just 
ignored. What remains to be seen is what levels of alienation, disenchantment and disengagement 
are generated for the non-elite citizen by the elite reaction to the EU vote and to the possible 
overturning of that result through once mechanism or another. Such a betrayal of the results of 
popular democratic engagement in a decision about a single issue could fundamentally undermine 
public faith and engagement in the representative and participatory processes more generally. The 
elite may further strengthen their elite control and status by ensuring that the wrong people have 
their apathy intensified and fail to participate in politics (See, Morris-Jones, 1954). 
The refrain, ‘if you don’t want to know the answer, don’t ask the question’ is simply not good enough 
to justify excluding voters from complex political decisions at the outset of the 21
st
 century. While 
referendum may have their weaknesses (see, Qvortrup, 2005), not least that the result may disagree 
with elite preferences, in a mature democracy the idea that the issue is too complex, not suitable for 
large-scale electoral input or that the voters cannot be trusted to react appropriately, are 
dangerously anti-democratic. So too is the attitudes among elites that if only the voters had a bit 
more information and wisdom they would come to share the elite view But, more dangerous still is 
the elite assumption that if we do ask the voters and they get it wrong, that elites of one sort or 
another have the right to dispute, delay and or over-turn the results of the choice of the voters 
which do not accord with elite policy preferences. What is clear is that asking citizens to vote on 
issues, such as membership of the EU, is likely to only be used only for those issues where elites can 
guarantee plebiscitary approval of their policy preferences.  The strength of a democratic system, it 
appears, is not in the tolerance of the public to being ignored by the elite, or in their willingness to 
16 
 
consent to be governed, but in the nature of elite reaction to a defeat by the plebs and in the latter 
we are currently left wanting and indeed worried.    
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